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I COMMENTSI
Foster Child Abuse in Pennsylvania:
Pursuing Actions Against the County
Placement Agency
I. Introduction
A city welfare commissioner with legal custody of a three-year
old girl placed the child in a foster home.' The welfare department
had contracted with a placement agency, which determined the suit-
ability of the prospective foster parents.2 The agency remained re-
sponsible for supervising the girl's care after placement.' By the time
the girl turned ten, she was the victim of severe physical and sexual
abuse by her foster father." The foster parent beat the girl, threw her
down a flight of stairs, and lacerated her with a hunting knife.3 The
sexual abuse, which the girl endured for over six years, included
forced sexual intercourse.' The father threatened the child with in-
stitutionalization if she informed anyone of the abuse.'
Throughout these years of abuse, the placement agency had
knowledge of suspected abuse in the home.' The agency, though re-
quired by law to report the suspected abuse to the State Department
of Social Services, failed to do so.9 Additionally, long periods elapsed
during which no agency personnel visited the foster home. 10
1. Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe I);
Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983) (Doe If).









94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1990
In another case, a two-year old girl was taken from her natural
parents by a court order that granted custody to a child services
agency."1 The agency then placed the child in foster care where she
was "willfully struck, shaken, thrown down, beaten and otherwise
severely abused by the foster mother. 1 2 This abuse caused the child
to lapse into a coma.18
These and other children who suffer abuse14 at the hands of fos-
ter parents powerlessly endure intolerable situations. Their safety
and welfare are entrusted to agencies whose responsibility is to en-
sure the child's health and safety. Not all such agencies, however,
fulfill their intended purposes. All too often, an agency places a child
in an abusive home and fails to adequately supervise the foster care.
As a result, the child falls victim to physical, mental, and sexual
abuse.15 What recourse may an abused foster child pursue against
the placement agency that is responsible for the placement in the
abusive home?'"
The foster care system exists to provide safe and humane care
for children in the custody of the state.17 Often these children have
11. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792 (lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989).
12. Id. at 792.
13. Id.
14. In this Comment, the term abuse refers to acts or omissions that result in physical,
mental, or sexual injury to a child. Pennsylvania defines child abuse as:
serious physical or mental injury which is not explained by the available medical
history as being accidental, or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation, or serious
physical neglect, of a child under 18 years of age, if the injury, abuse or neglect
has been caused by the acts or omissions of the child's parents or by a person
responsible for the child's welfare, or any individual residing in the same home
as the child, or a paramour of the child's parent provided, however, no child
shall be deemed to be physically or mentally abused for the sole reason he is in
good faith furnished treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accor-
dance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomi-
nation by a duly accredited practitioner thereof or is not provided specified med-
ical treatment in the practice of religious beliefs, or solely on the ground of
environmental factors which are beyond the control of the person responsible for
the child's welfare such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
15. See, e.g., infra notes 35, 40, 71, 83 and accompanying text.
16. See generally Donella, Safe Foster Care: A Constitutional Mandate, 19 FAM. L.Q.
79 (1985); Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Chil-
dren from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988); Comment, Child
Abuse in Foster Homes: A Rationale for Pursuing Causes of Actions Against the Placement
Agency, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 975 (1984).
17. See Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Children Out-
runs the Ability to Improve Parental Functioning, 20 FAM. L.Q. 213, 219-20 (1986) ("In
theory, foster care is supposed to be a short-term remedy designed to protect children from
harm while parents have time to respond to treatment."); Musewicz, The Failure of Foster
Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
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been abused or abandoned by their natural parents.' Others are vol-
untarily placed in the system by their natural parents. 19 Foster care
is intended to provide the child with a safe and nurturing environ-
ment until the child is returned to the natural family or is offered a
permanent home through adoption.20 In most cases, the goal of fos-
ter care is realized, and the child receives loving care.2 Often, how-
ever, the foster system fails to meet this goal.2 Foster child abuse is
the most severe manifestation of the system's failure to provide the
intended haven.23
When the foster care system fails and foster parents prove to be
abusive, the foster parents are subject to criminal prosecution.2"
What sanctions can be imposed upon the placement agency, how-
ever, whose acts or omissions contributed to the foster child abuse?
This Comment explores the foster care system in Pennsylvania
and examines the likelihood of recovery by abused foster children
against Pennsylvania placement agencies.2 5 First, this Comment dis-
cusses suits brought against placement agencies in other jurisdic-
tions. Foster children have successfully pursued both negligence and
civil rights actions against placement agencies. The difficulties inher-
633, 637 (1981) ("[Tlhe stated goal of foster care is to provide temporary placements for
children unable for a time to live at home .... ") (footnote omitted).
18. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975); Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children From Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976)
19. But see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977) (ques-
tioning whether these placements are truly voluntary in light of the often-present threat of
neglect proceedings and the lack of informed consent); Musewicz, supra note 17, at 639
("[T]he need for and actual voluntariness of such placement agreements are often dubious.").
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. See Besharov, supra note 17, at 219 ("Research shows positive results in foster care
because, for many children, foster care is an extremely beneficial experience."); Comment,
supra note 16, at 979 n.31.
22. See M. HARDIN, COURT RULES TO ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR FOSTER CHILDREN
(1984) (commenting on the failure of the foster care system and proposing model rules
designed to achieve permanent and stable homes for foster children); Mnookin, Foster
Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973) (suggesting that children
are unnecessarily placed in foster care and remain in the system for too long).
23. But see Besharov, supra note 17, at 218 ("Despite recent media publicity about the
abuse and neglect of foster children, the vast majority receive substantially better physical care
while away from their parents.").
24. See, e.g., National Bank of S.D. v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 846 (S.D. 1982) (super-
seded by statute as stated in Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1987)) (abusive foster
father convicted of rape in the first degree and indecent molestation of a minor child).
25. 55 PA. CODE § 3700.4 (1987) defines a placing agency as "the agency or individual
with legal authority to refer or place a child for foster family care. Included are courts, county
children and youth social service agencies and parents." This Comment, however, discusses
only county children and youth social service agencies.
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ent in these actions, including proving all the elements of each cause
of action and overcoming the hurdle of governmental immunity,
merit special attention." Second, this Comment focuses on the foster
care system in Pennsylvania, including the circumstances that bring
a child into the system and the regulations governing the system. In
addition, this Comment discusses the extent of abuse in Pennsylvania
foster homes. 7 Third, this Comment analyzes both negligence and
civil rights theories to determine the likelihood that an abused foster
child will recover against the Pennsylvania placement agency. 8 Fi-
nally, this Comment evaluates proposed solutions to the problem of
abuse in Pennsylvania foster homes. 9
II. Causes of Action Available to Abused Foster Children
A. Negligence Actions
In state courts, abused foster children, alleging that a placement
agency negligently selected the foster parents, negligently supervised
the child after placement, or negligently failed to heed warnings con-
cerning the abuse, have brought actions against the agencies."0 Al-
though some of these suits have been successful," others have
failed.3 2 In Bartels v. County of Westchester,3 for example, the
court addressed the county's liability for injuries inflicted upon a fos-
ter child after the county child services agency negligently placed
and supervised the child.3 4 The two-year old child was severely
burned and scarred when the foster mother carelessly bathed her in
scalding water. 35 The court, recognizing the county's duty to exercise
due care in its selection and supervision of foster parents, held that
26. See infra notes 30-133 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 178-229 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
30. Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970); Vonner v.
State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973); Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb.
67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977); Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d
906 (1980); National Bank of S.D. v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982) (superseded by
statute as stated in Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1987)). See generally Annotation,
Governmental Tort Liability for Social Service Agency's Negligence in Placement, or Super-
vision After Placement, of Children, 90 A.L.R.3D 1214 (1979).
31. See Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980);
National Bank of S.D. v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982) (superseded by statute as stated
in Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1987)). These suits are deemed successful because
the child's cause of action was allowed to proceed, regardless of whether recovery actually
resulted.
32. See Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977).
33. 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
34. Id. at 519, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
35. Id. at 520, 429 N.Y.S,2d at 908.
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the county could be found liable under these circumstances and di-
rected the child's cause of action against the county to proceed.3"
By contrast, the court in Koepf v. County of York 37 upheld the
trial court's determination that the county welfare department was
not negligent in its selection and supervision of the foster parent.38 In
Koepf, a young child, adjudged to be neglected, was taken from his
natural mother and placed in a foster home. 39 The child later died
from severe injuries inflicted by the foster mother.4" Although the
court recognized that a county welfare department may be held lia-
ble for a breach of its duty to reasonably care for children in its
custody,4' the court refused to disturb on review the lower court's
finding that the county agency had not acted negligently.42
Although an abused foster child's right to pursue a negligence
action against the placement agency is recognized in a number of
jurisdictions,43 the right to pursue an action does not guarantee re-
covery. Inherent difficulties are present in negligence actions.4 The
child must first prove each element of a negligence claim,45 and then
overcome the defense of governmental immunity."6
1. Elements of Negligence.-First, the abused foster child
must show that the agency had a duty to children in its custody.
4 7
Normally, the agency's duty is imposed by state statute.48 These
statutes and accompanying foster care regulations require the agency
36. Id. at 523, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The court stated:
If, as has been asserted, the appellants knew of the incompetence of the foster
parents or the indifferent discharge by them of their duties, the appellants might
be held liable for an ensuing injury to the child, dependent on the evidence at a
trial.
Id. at 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
37. 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977).
38. Id. at 77, 251 N.W.2d at 872.
39. Id. at 68-69, 251 N.W.2d at 868.
40. Id. at 69, 251 N.W.2d at 868.
41. Id. at 74, 251 N.W.2d at 871.
42. Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 77, 251 N.W.2d 866, 872 (1977). The court
noted that "[u]nder our standard of review, the judgment must be affirmed since the trial
court's determination was not clearly wrong." Id.
43. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
44. See Mushlin, supra note 16, at 247 (recognizing the problem of sovereign immunity,
the unavailability of respondeat superior, and the reluctance of courts to find an agency negli-
gent in its supervisory capacity); Comment, supra note 16, at 982-84 (discussing the difficulty
of proving duty and proximate cause and overcoming sovereign immunity).
45. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
47. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (5th ed. 1971).
48. State statutes generally authorize the placement of children in foster homes and
impose a duty on the agency to supervise the children and to remove them from the foster
home when necessary. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE §§ 3700.1-3700.73, 3130.64 (1987).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1990
to provide a safe environment for the foster child. Also, whether or
not a statutory duty exists, the common law imposes a duty on the
agency.49 Once the agency obtains custody of the child, the agency is
responsible for ensuring that the child remains safe.50
Second, the child must demonstrate a breach of this duty to
provide safe care.51 When the agency fails to provide safety and free-
dom from harm, its duty is breached.52
Third, the child must show causation.53 This element presents
considerable difficulty for the abused foster child. The supervising
agencies argue that the abusive acts of the foster parents are an in-
tervening, superseding cause, relieving the agency of any liability.5
Indeed, case law indicates that if the agency can show that the foster
parent's abuse was unforeseeable, the argument may succeed.55 In
Parker v. St. Christopher's Home,56 for example, the court held that
the agency that placed the child in an abusive home was not liable
because the foster parents' control of the infant child was sufficiently
independent from the agency to "protect the [agency] from liability
for acts of negligence not reasonably to be anticipated."57
Finally, the foster child seeking to bring an action in negligence
must demonstrate injury.58 In light of the grave physical and emo-
tional injuries that may be suffered by abused foster children, this
element is easily established.59
2. Governmental Immunity.-Even if the foster child can
make out a prima facie case of negligence, the action may still be
49. See Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980).
The court stated: "It is well settled that one assuming to act, though not under a duty, must
act with care, especially when looking after children." Id. at 521-22, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909
(citing Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) and 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 18:6, at 1044-45 (1956)).
50. The court in Bartels stated the applicable standard of care: "Here the appellants
undertook to care for the infant plaintiff, and this duty, once assumed, had to be carried out
with due regard for the child's safety." 76 A.D.2d at 522, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
51. See PROSSER, supra note 47, § 30, at 143.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Comment, supra note 16, at 983.
55. But if defendant's duty requires him to anticipate the intervening intentional or
criminal acts of another and guard against them, such acts cannot supersede defendant's liabil-
ity. See PROSSER, supra note 47, § 44, at 275; see also Wallinga v. Johnson, 269 Minn. 436,
440, 131 N.W.2d 215, 219-20 (1964) ("The original actor cannot claim immunity from liabil-
ity for loss when the possibility that third persons will act in a certain manner is one of the
hazards he should guard against.").
56. 77 A.D.2d 921, 431 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1980).
57. Id. at 921, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
58. See PROSSER, supra note 47, § 30, at 143.
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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blocked by governmental immunity. Governmental immunity,
whether judicially6" or legislatively established, 61 provides that a gov-
ernment subdivision is immune from liability for any injuries or
damages resulting from its acts or omissions." Some states adhere to
a form of the doctrine that disallows all suits against local govern-
ment subdivisions except in narrowly defined areas.6 3 This immunity
doctrine denies only the resulting liability of the subdivision, not the
underlying tort.
64
Other jurisdictions distinguish between a subdivision's ministe-
rial and discretionary functions.6 5 When a governmental unit acts in
a discretionary manner, it is protected by governmental immunity.
66
By contrast, when the governmental subdivision performs ministerial
functions, immunity is not available. 7 In order to bring a successful
action in a jurisdiction that recognizes this distinction, the child
must classify the agency's acts as ministerial rather than
discretionary. 68
Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the placement and
supervision of children in a foster home is a discretionary or ministe-
rial activity. Some courts have held that discretion is exercised and
immunity bars the action.69 In Pickett v. Washington County,70 for
example, a runaway girl placed in foster care was injured in a horse-
back riding accident when her foster parents allowed her to ride un-
60. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) is generally cited as the
judicial origin of governmental immunity. United States courts followed this precedent and
developed their own doctrine of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Dean v. New Milford
Township, 5 Watts & Serg. 545 (Pa. 1843) (establishing governmental immunity in
Pennsylvania).
61. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 (West 1972); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§
815-818 (West 1963).
62. See PROSSER, supra note 47, § 131, at 970.
63. See, e.g., infra notes 188-91.
64. See PROSSER, supra note 47, § 131, at 970.
65. A ministerial act is one that is performed by a person or board "in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to or the exercise of his
or their own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
899 (5th ed. 1979). A discretionary act is "[o]ne which requires exercise in judgment and
choice and involves what is just and proper under the circumstances." Id. at 419.
66. 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 17:26, at 171
(1988) (recognizing that immunity is provided to governments performing discretionary func-
tions because it is the function of the state to govern; private citizens should not interfere with
the governing process by challenging governmental policy decisions through private tort ac-
tions) (footnote omitted).
67. 2 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 66, § 6:12, at 74 ("The authorities
appear to be pretty well agreed that governmental bodies are not immune, but may be held
liable in tort, for wrongful performance, etc., of acts that are merely ministerial.") (footnote
omitted).
68. See Comment, supra note 16, at 983-84.
69. See Mushlin, supra note 16, at 246 n.250.
70. 31 Or. App. 1263, 572 P.2d 1070 (1977).
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attended.71 The minor sued the county and the foster parents. 72 The
court held that both the county and its agents, the foster parents,
were immune from tort liability for conduct involving a discretionary
act or function. 73 The court pointed to the "delicate and complex
judgments '7 involved in placing and supervising foster children and
stated that these judgments "should not be subject to hindsight scru-
tiny by courts and juries. 75
By contrast, other courts have held that discretion is not exer-
cised in placing and supervising foster children; therefore, immunity
is not an available defense.76 In Elton v. County of Orange," the
court held that immunity was not available to the defendant
county.78 The court found that although decisions made regarding
the abused foster child may "entail the exercise of discretion in a
literal sense," 79 the level of a basic policy decision is not reached. 80
In a similar case,81 two abused girls brought suit through their
guardian ad litem against individual social workers who placed the
children82 in foster care, where the children suffered sexual and
physical abuse.8" The court, describing the social worker's functions
as ministerial, held that no immunity was available.84
B. Civil Rights Actions
Some abused foster children have bypassed state courts and the
difficulties inherent in negligence suits. These children have instead
pursued causes of action against placement agencies in federal
courts.85 Alleging that the abuse suffered at the hands of their foster
71. Id. at 1265, 572 P.2d at 1072.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1269, 572 P.2d at 1074.
74. Id. at 1268, 572 P.2d at 1074.
75. Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 1268, 572 P.2d 1070, 1074
(1977).
76. See Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
77. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
78. Id. at 1057, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
79. Id. at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
80. Id.
81. National Bank of S.D. v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982) (superseded by statute
as stated in Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1987)).
82. Id. at 846.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 850.
85. See, e.g., L.J. v. Massigna, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
816 (1989); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337
(1989); Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 864 (1983) (Doe II); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983); Doe v. New York
Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe 1); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F.
Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
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parents constitutes a violation of their civil rights, the children have
brought actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 Before a foster child can
successfully pursue this federal cause of action, however, the child
must prove the elements of a section 1983 action87 and overcome the
agency's possible immunity.
88
1. Elements of a Section 1983 Action.-Section 1983 creates
liability for state action that has caused a plaintiff to suffer depriva-
tion of a constitutional right.8 9 In order to bring an action under this
statute, four elements must be proven. First, the child must demon-
strate a violation of his constitutionally protected rights.90 Second, he
must show that this violation occurred through the action or omis-
sion of a person acting under color of state law. 91 Third, the foster
child must prove that the acts or omissions were a substantial factor
leading to the deprivation of the constitutionally protected interest.
9 2
Finally, the child pursuing a section 1983 action against the place-
ment agency must allege more than mere negligence.9"
Abused foster children have been able to fulfill these require-
ments and have pursued section 1983 actions.9 ' In these cases, the
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
87. See infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). "The purpose of this section has been said to be to provide
a civil action to protect persons against misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible because the defendant was clothed with the authority of the state." I C. AN-
TIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 29, at 49 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted).
90. This section does not create a remedy for every wrong committed under color of
state law. Only deprivations of rights served by the Constitution or laws of the United States
are actionable. Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
946 (1977).
91. Graseck v. Mauceri, 582 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979); Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
92. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (if municipal policy
causing constitutional deprivation is not itself unconstitutional, plaintiff must show both fault
on the part of the municipality and a causal connection between the policy and the constitu-
tional deprivation); Surowitz v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 376 F. Supp.
369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (action under § 1983 does not lie unless a nexus exists between the
facts alleged and the deprivation of the protected right).
93. See Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980);
Holmes v. Golden, 615 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1980).
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally protected interest that is violated by foster child
abuse is the right to safety, or the right to be free from harm.9" In
Brooks v. Richardson,9" the court recognized these rights, holding
that a child placed in a foster home is entitled to humane custodial
care.
97
Placement agencies that supervise foster children and attempt
to provide this humane custodial care are generally state-created and
act in accordance with state guidelines and regulations.98 Therefore,
when the agency places a child in an abusive home and fails to ade-
quately supervise the child, the agency may be deemed to have acted
under color of state law.99
An abused foster child pursuing a section 1983 action can usu-
ally establish the presence of the first two elements: violation of a
constitutionally protected right and action under color of state law.
Demonstrating that the agency was more than merely negligent and
that its acts or omissions proximately caused the deprivation of the
child's right to safety, however, poses greater difficulty. In Doe v.
New York Department of Social Services,100 a foster child filed a
complaint against the placement agency for failing to adequately su-
pervise the foster home.101 The court recognized the child's right to
be free from harm,'10 2 and noted that the defendant placement
agency had various statutory obligations and acted under color of
state law.' 03 The court then considered the other elements of a sec-
tion 1983 action. The court ruled that
[d]efendants may be held liable under § 1983 if they, or in case
of an agency, its top supervisory personnel, exhibited deliberate
indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty,
and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the
risk or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiff's deprivation of
95. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.
La. 1976).
96. 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
97. Id. at 795.
98. See infra notes 134-68 and accompanying text.
99. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (child care institution with
custody of children acted under color of state law); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (county agents acted under color of state law with respect to
county jail prisoners).
100. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (Doe 1); 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 864 (1983) (Doe 1[).
101. Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 137.
102. Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 141.
103. Doe H, 709 F.2d at 786-87. The placement agency did not contest the applicability
of § 1983.
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rights under the Constitution."0 4
In Doe, the agency failed to report the suspected abuse to the
Department of Social Services, neglected to visit the foster home at
regular intervals, and failed to submit comprehensive reports con-
cerning the foster child. 10 5 At the second trial, the jury received
proper instructions concerning the meaning of "deliberate indiffer-
ence,"' 0 6 the applicable standard of liability, and found that the
agency had displayed deliberate indifference that proximately caused
the foster child's abuse. 107 On appeal from the district court's entry
of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized that the evidence justified a finding of deliber-
ate indifference' 08 and reinstated the jury verdict. 109
In a similar case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied
on Doe and recognized the right of an abused foster child to pursue
a section 1983 action." 0 The court held that a child involuntarily
placed in a foster home may bring an action against the state place-
ment officials"' for those injuries sustained in the foster home." 2
Although the defendants were individual officials, the court followed
the same analysis as the Doe court."' The court first recognized that
the child pleaded a sufficient liberty interest, which the court charac-
104. Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 145.
105. Doe 11, 709 F.2d at 787.
106. The court stated that grossly negligent conduct creates a strong presumption of
deliberate indifference, but distinguished the two terms by calling gross negligence a type of
conduct and deliberate indifference a state of mind. Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 143.
107. Doe 11, 709 F.2d at 787.
108. Noting the difference between the foster care system and the prison system, the
court stated:
[Dieliberate indifference ought not to be inferred from a failure to act as readily
as might be done in the prison context, since in the foster care situation, there
are obvious alternative explanations for a family being given the benefit of the
doubt and the agency refusing to intervene.
Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 142.
109. Doe 1I, 709 F.2d at 792.
110. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337
(1989).
Ill. The plaintiff alleged that the officials:
(1) failed to thoroughly investigate the fitness of the foster home; (2) knew or
should have known the foster parents were unfit to be trusted with her care,
custody, and supervision; (3) failed to maintain proper supervision in inspection
of the foster home; and (4) failed to obtain complete physical and medical
records, or to furnish available records to the foster parents.
Id. at 793.
112. Id. at 797.
113. Plaintiff made a second claim, alleging that Georgia's statutory scheme of foster
care created a legitimate claim of entitlement enforceable under Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). The court held that the Georgia child care system gave rise to a "Roth-
type claim." 818 F.2d at 800.
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terized as "the right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary
pain, as that interest is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, and the fundamental right to physical safety as protected by
the fourteenth amendment.""' 4 Continuing the analysis, the court
stated that the state officials' failure to prevent the abuse must have
been a factor leading to the violation of the child's constitutionally
protected interest." 5 Finally, the court noted that by failing to inter-
vene, the officials must have displayed deliberate indifference. 1 6 The
court remanded for a determination of these issues.' 7
Case law indicates that the abused foster child can bring an
action under section 1983, if he can demonstrate that his right to
safety has been violated by an act or omission of the placement
agency that amounts to deliberate indifference. The Doe decision
provides guidance for the child pursuing a section 1983 action,
whether the child sues the agency as a governmental subdivision or
sues the individual caseworker and officials involved in the child's
case.
2. Section 1983 Immunities.-Even if the abused foster child
establishes all of the required elements of a section 1983 action, the
agency may defend the action by claiming immunity from suit.' 8
Developments in civil rights law, however, point to the likelihood
that the agency will be amenable to suit despite claimed immunity.
In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,"9 the
United States Supreme Court held that a local government agency
may be held liable for the deprivation of a constitutional right if the
resulting injury is caused by the agency's official policy. 2 In so de-
ciding, the Court overruled an earlier decision that granted state and
local governments immunity from suit under section 1983.121
The trend begun in Monell continued in Owen v. City of Inde-
122thpendence, in which the Supreme Court held that local government
agencies cannot claim immunity from section 1983 on the basis that
114. 818 F.2d at 794.




118. See generally I C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 98, at 180 (2d ed.
1980).
119. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
120. Id. at 690.
121. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
122. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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the official policy was made in good faith. 123 In other words, "local
governmental agencies could be [held] strictly liable for unconstitu-
tional deprivations resulting from their official policies."124
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,125 however, the Court held that gov-
ernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages, insofar as their conduct
does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional
right. 126 This holding, providing for qualified immunity, applies to
governmental officials performing discretionary functions; therefore,
it may apply to cases in which an abused foster child sues individual
case workers or agency officials. By contrast, if the child sues the
agency as a governmental subdivision, Harlow would not apply.
Owen's holding that "municipalities have no immunity from dam-
ages liability flowing from their constitutional violations ....
was not modified by Harlow. 28 In Hynson v. City of Chester,129 the
court followed this analysis in a case in which a county prison board
of inspectors faced a section 1983 claim. The court, finding that
"[in no way has Harlow modified the central holding in Owen,"'
130
held that the board was not entitled to assert the qualified immunity
defense.'3' A child placement agency, which is similar to a county
prison board, would not be entitled to defend a section 1983 suit by
claiming qualified immunity.
13 2
The recognition that a local government agency can be liable
under section 1983, and that the agency may not assert an immunity
defense, suggests that an abused foster child may pursue a section
1983 action against a placement agency. Although the qualified im-
munity defense could possibly be available to individual case workers
or agency officials,' such a defense would not be available to a
placement agency displaying deliberate indifference to the foster
child's safety.
123. Id. at 657.
124. Comment, supra note 16, at 987.
125. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
126. Id. at 818.
127. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
128. Hynson v. City of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 934 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 702 (1988).
129. 827 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 702 (1988).
130. Id. at 934.
131. Id.
132. A child placement agency, like a county prison board, acts on behalf of the state to
restrain an individual's freedom. It is this restraint on liberty that triggers the protections of
the due process clause. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct.
998, 1006 (1989).
133. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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III. Foster Care in Pennsylvania
A. Organization and Regulation of Foster Care
In Pennsylvania, a county agency can place a child in foster
care when one of three conditions exists. 13  First, if the agency ob-
tains legal custody of the child through a voluntary placement agree-
ment135 signed by the child's natural parents or the person legally
responsible for the child, the agency can then place the child in a
family foster home.13 6 Second, placement may occur if authorized by
a court order' 3 7 issued pursuant to Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act.138
Third, the Juvenile Act authorizes the agency to place children al-
ready taken into custody under the Act.'3 9 The Act permits the
Commonwealth to intervene, either through a court order or through
protective custody, to protect children deemed dependent. 40 These
dependent children are then placed in foster family homes approved
by the county children and youth services agency. 4
These county agencies are part of a statewide system. The
Pennsylvania Department of Welfare regulates social services for the
Commonwealth's children, but each of Pennsylvania's sixty-seven
counties has a children and youth services agency that bears respon-
134. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.64 (1987).
135. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
136. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.64(2) (1987).
137. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.64(1) (1987).
138. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6365 (1978).
139. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.64(3) (1987). The Juvenile Act mandates a hearing within 72
hours after the child is taken into custody. Rehearing determines whether the child should
remain in custody. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6332 (1978).
140. The Act defines a dependent child as a child who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as re-
quired by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or
emotional health, or morals;
(2) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law;
(3) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other custodian;
(4) is without a parent, guardian or legal custodian;
(5) while subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually and without
justification truant from school;
(6) has committed a specific act or acts of habitual disobedience of the
reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian or other custodian and
who is ungovernable and found to be in need of care, treatment or supervision;
(7) is under the age of ten years and has committed a delinquent act;
(8) has been formerly adjudicated dependent. and is under the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its conditions or placements and who commits an act
which is defined as ungovernable in paragraph (6); or
(9) has been referred (pursuant to section 6323 relating to informal adjust-
ment), and who commits an act which is defined as ungovernable in paragraph
(6).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1978).
141. See 55 PA. CODE §§ 3700.1-3700.73 (1987).
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sibility for providing services to the children.1" 2 The Department of
Welfare has the authority to promulgate regulations governing the
administration of county agencies." 3 The Public Welfare Code pro-
vides that the "department shall assure within the Commonwealth
the availability and equitable provision of adequate public child wel-
fare services for all children who need them, regardless of religion,
race, settlement, residence, or economic or social status.""" The De-
partment has promulgated regulations designed to carry out this
mandate.14
One set of regulations concerns the administration of the county
children and youth social service programs.' 4" The goal of these reg-
ulations is to "ensure the proper accomplishment of the child welfare
duties vested by law in the counties." '47 Among these duties is the
obligation to provide substitute care in family foster homes." 8 Spe-
cific regulations address the foster care program." 9 For example,
foster homes must comply with fire, safety, and building require-
ments. '5 Also, each county agency must develop and implement a
written policy to govern grievances filed by foster children.15 '
Another important set of regulations addresses the foster family
care agency. 52 These regulations detail specific requirements to en-
sure the health and safety of foster children, and provide a compre-
hensive evaluation process for determining a foster home's suitabil-
ity. 153  The regulations specifically forbid abusive disciplinary
practices.' 5' Passive physical restraint'55 is the only method of disci-
pline permitted.' 56 The agency may revoke foster family approval if
any of the regulations are violated.' 57 In Martz v. Department of
142. JUVENILE LAW CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LAW 19 (1987).
143. Authority is granted to the Department pursuant to 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701
(1967).
144. Id.
145. 55 PA. CODE §§ 3130, 3700 (1982).
146. 55 PA. CODE § 3130 (1982).
147. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.2 (1982).
148. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.12(c)(2) (1982).
149. 55 PA. CODE §§ 3130.81-3130.92 (1987).
150. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.81(a) (1987).
151. 55 PA. CODE§ 3130.88(a) (1987).
152. 55 PA. CODE §§ 3700.1-3700.73 (1982).
153. Id.
154. 55 PA. CODE § 3700.63(b)(1) (1987).
155. Passive physical restraint is defined as "[tihe least amount of direct physical con-
tact required to prevent immediate harm to the child or others." 55 PA. CODE § 3700.4 (1987).
156. 55 PA. CODE § 3700.63(c) (1987).
157. 55 PA. CODE § 3700.69 (1987) requires an annual reevaluation of each foster fam-
ily in order to
determine continued compliance with the requirements of §§ 3700.62-3700.67
(relating to foster parent requirements; foster child discipline, punishment and
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Public Welfare,158 for example, the court reviewed a decision by the
Adams County Child and Youth Services Agency to disapprove a
foster family home. 159 Six months after three children were placed in
a foster home, the child abuse hotline received an anonymous call
indicating a problem in the foster home. °10 The Department of Pub-
lic Welfare conducted an investigation; upon review of the Depart-
ment's findings, the county agency removed the children from the
home and revoked approval of the foster parents. 16 The foster par-
ents sought judicial review of the decision, 162 but the court held that
clear evidence supported the disapproval.16 3 The evidence revealed
that the foster parents used more than passive physical restraint: the
foster parents tied a child to a bed, locked a child in a bedroom, and
placed pepper on the tongue of a child who refused to eat.1
6
In this instance, the Adams County Child and Youth Services
Agency acted quickly and effectively to remove the children from the
abusive foster home. Had the agency failed to heed the warning of
abuse, however, the three children would have continued to endure
physical and mental anguish.'65 In such a case, the agency's failure
to act would contribute to the child's suffering, and as a result, the
agency should be responsible for its inability to provide a safe
environment.
control policy; assessment of foster parent capability; foster parent training; fos-
ter family residence requirements; and safety requirements).
158. 113 Pa. Commw. 110, 536 A.2d 496 (1988).




163. Martz v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 113 Pa. Commw. 110, I11, 536 A.2d 496,
497 (1988).
164. Id.
165. Child abuse is a serious societal problem with many ramifications. Abused children
face many physical and psychological problems.
Children who have been physically or emotionally abused or neglected are
at serious risk of physical and psychological consequences extending well beyond
the injuries or other conditions that might bring such children to the attention of
public agencies. Typical of the more immediate consequences are anemia, hear-
ing loss, growth failure, and poor health. Longer-term, more than half of abused
children may be expected to experience developmental impairments in motor
ability, learning, memory, understanding, perception, or speech and language.
Abused children, including those who have been sexually abused, can hardly
escape psychological consequences, such as depression, anxiety, low self-esteem,
and self-destructive behavior, that may impair their ability to function and relate
to others. The psychological effects of abuse may lead to delinquent or criminal
behavior and clearly place victims at risk of repeating the abusive patterns to
which they themselves were exposed.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FAMILY VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 8
(1987) (footnotes omitted); see also THE BATTERED CHILD (C.H. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed.
1980).
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Pennsylvania law recognizes the special problems that arise
when child abuse occurs in foster homes. For instance, a regulation
provides for cases of abuse perpetrated by a county agent, such as a
foster parent.""6 In such cases, the investigation is conducted by the
regional staff' 6 7 of the Department of Public Welfare, rather than by
the county agency. This shift of responsibility eliminates any poten-
tial conflict of interest.6 8
B. Extent of Abuse in Pennsylvania Foster Homes
Although the regulations governing foster care in Pennsylvania
are designed to protect the health, safety, and human rights of foster
children,' 9 this goal is not always realized. Child abuse does occur
in Pennsylvania foster homes. In 1987, the Childline and Abuse
Registry Hotline and county children and youth services agencies re-
ceived a total of 359 reports of abuse in foster homes.170 Of these
reports, 91, or 25.3 percent, were substantiated.' 7 ' This number rep-
resented an increase from 1986, when 85 of 396 reports, or 21.3 per-
cent, were substantiated. 7  Also, in 1987, the total number of re-
ported injuries to abused foster children was 135,'Il a 14.4 percent
increase from 1986.'" One death was reported. 75
166. 55 PA. CODE § 3490.81 (1985). A foster parent is an agent of the county agency.
55 PA. CODE § 3490.4 (1985).
167. Regional staff are "department employees who license and monitor public and pri-
vate children and youth social service agencies and facilities within a specific geographical area
of the Commonwealth." 55 PA. CODE § 3490.4 (1985).
168. OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUB-
LIC WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE REPORT 87, at 16 (1987) [hereinafter CHILD ABUSE REPORT].
Other Pennsylvania regulations are designed to ensure that foster child abuse does not occur.
For example, 55 PA. CODE § 3700.62(c) (1987) requires prospective foster parents to comply
with § 2223.1 of the Child Protective Services Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2201 (Purdon
Supp. 1988). Prospective foster parents are required to submit to the agency information re-
garding any criminal record or any record naming the prospective foster parent as a child
abuse perpetrator. Id.
169. The foster family care regulations are designed
to reduce risk to children in placement; to protect their health, safety and human
rights; to establish minimum requirements for the operation of a foster family
care agency; and to establish minimum requirements to be applied by foster
family care agencies when approving or supervising foster families.
55 PA. CODE § 3700.2 (1987).
170. CHILD ABUSE REPORT, supra note 168, at 17.
171. Id. Substantiated reports include both founded and indicated reports of child abuse.
A report is founded when there has been a judicial determination that the child was abused. A
report is indicated when the Child Protective Services determines that there is substantial
evidence of abuse based on medical evidence, an investigation, or admission of the abuse by
the perpetrator. Id. at 1.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id. at 18. The total number of injuries exceeds the number of substantiated cases of
abuse because incidents of abuse may involve more than one injury. Id. at 16.
174. Id. at 16.
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Although these figures reveal that the number of abused foster
children is small relative to the total number of all children abused
in Pennsylvania,' 76 the horrid injuries inflicted upon these children
make this an alarming problem that must be addressed. The county
children and youth services agencies, whose acts or omissions con-
tribute to the abuse, should be held accountable. This accountability
will ameliorate the problem of abuse, while ensuring that children
receive the promised safe and nurturing environment."'
IV. Causes of Action Available to Pennsylvania's Abused Foster
Children
The goal of Pennsylvania foster care is to ensure a safe environ-
ment for children who, for one reason or another, are in the custody
of the county children and youth services agency. 178 Once the county
agency has approved the foster family home, the foster parents pro-
vide the child's day-to-day care. When the foster parents provide
daily abuse instead, what recourse does the child have against the
agency? In Pennsylvania, how successful will the abused foster child
be in pursuing negligence or civil rights actions?
A. Negligence Actions
One possible course for the abused child to pursue is a negli-
gence action. The Pennsylvania child, alleging that the agency negli-
gently chose or supervised the foster home or that it failed to follow
its governing regulations, faces the same difficulties in a negligence
suit as plaintiffs in other jurisdictions.1
7 9
First, the child must establish the elements of negligence.' The
foster child can easily demonstrate a duty of care, as Pennsylvania
regulations impose a duty on the agency to protect and provide safe
care for children in its custody.'' A showing that the agency failed
to provide a safe environment by placing the child in an abusive
home would establish a breach of the agency's duty.8 2 The causa-
tion element presents greater difficulty, however, because the agency
175. CHILD ABUSE REPORT, supra note 168, at 19.
176. In 1987, 7192 substantiated incidents of child abuse in Pennsylvania occurred. Sub-
stantiated reports of abuse in foster homes accounted for less than 1.3% of this total. Id. at 3,
17.
177. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 47-84 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
181. See 55 PA. CODE § 3130.11-.12 (1982); 55 PA. CODE § 3700.2 (1987).
182. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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may argue that the foster parent's criminal acts were a superseding,
intervening cause, relieving the agency of liability."'3 For this argu-
ment to succeed, however, the Pennsylvania agency must show that
the parent's acts were unforeseeable.'84 If the agency had any infor-
mation concerning the possibility of abuse in the home, this argu-
ment would fail and causation could be established. Finally, the
child can easily establish the fourth element, injury." 5 In 1987
alone, Pennsylvania foster children suffered 135 reported injuries,""
ranging from burns and bruises to sexual assault and statutory
rape.1
8 7
If the abused foster child can demonstrate each of these ele-
ments, a second obstacle remains: Pennsylvania recognizes govern-
mental immunity. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act' 88 holds
local agencies immune from damages for any injury caused by the
agency or an agency employee."l 9 The local agency may be held lia-
ble under certain exceptions provided by the Act' 90 but these eight
183. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
184. Pennsylvania follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). See Skoda v.
West Penn Power, 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963). Section 448 of the Restatement
provides:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negli-
gent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity
to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
185. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
186. CHILD ABUSE REPORT, supra note 168, at 18.
187. Id. at 9.
188. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1980). The statute reads: "[N]o local
agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused
by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person." Id. The Act was
challenged on the ground that the Act closed the courts to plaintiffs, denying them "remedy by
due course of law." See PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. Finding the Act constitutional despite its
failure to provide a remedy for injuries caused by municipalities, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated: "[Tihe Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act is a valid exercise of legislative
authority specifically granted by our Constitution." Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363,
370, 437 A.2d 394, 398 (1981).
189. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1980). The Pennsylvania legislature en-
acted the immunity statute after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abrogated Pennsylvania's
judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Pub.
Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), See generally Comment, The Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act: Pennsylvania's Response to the Problems of Municipal Tort Liability, 84
DICK. L. REV. 717 (1980); Comment, Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act Held Constitu-
tional, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 643 (1982).
190. Immunity is waived in eight categories: vehicle liability; care, custody, or control of
personal property; care, custody, or control of real property; dangerous condition of trees and
traffic controls; dangerous condition of utility facilities; dangerous condition of streets; danger-
ous condition of sidewalks; and care, custody, or control of animals. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
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exceptions are construed narrowly.19'
In Pennsylvania, even when a county agency's negligence results
in foster child abuse, the agency will not be liable. A Pennsylvania
county child and youth services agency is a local agency within the
meaning of the Tort Claims Act, 192 and, therefore, the county
agency falls within the Act's scope of immunity. Furthermore, the
acts or omissions of the agency that lead to the abuse of foster chil-
dren do not fit within any of the Act's limited exceptions. 93 As a
result, the county agency will have governmental immunity available
as a defense to any negligence action brought by an abused foster
child."'
B. Civil Rights Actions
The availability of governmental immunity to a county agency
in Pennsylvania forces the abused foster child to seek redress for his
injuries in federal court. To pursue a claim under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the child must demonstrate the necessary
elements. 19 5 A Pennsylvania foster child has the same constitution-
ally protected right to safety as do foster children in other jurisdic-
tions. 196 If the abused child establishes that the county agency's acts
or omissions caused the child to be deprived of this right, and that
the agency, a state actor, displayed deliberate indifference, the child
may maintain a section 1983 action against the agency.'97 Further-
more, Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act would
§ 8542(b) (Purdon 1982).
Before these exceptions apply, plaintiff must show: first, that the damage would be recov-
erable at common law or by statute if the injury were caused by a person without the immu-
nity defense, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)(1) (Purdon 1982); and second, that the
injury was caused by the negligence of the agency or its employee acting within the scope of
its or his duty, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)(2) (Purdon 1982).
191. See City of Philadelphia v. Love, 98 Pa. Commw. 138, 142, 509 A.2d 1388, 1390
(1986). The court stated: "The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act confers immunity upon
local agencies except for certain limited exceptions. These exceptions to immunity are to be
interpreted narrowly." (citing Vann v. Board of Educ., 76 Pa. Commw. 604, 464 A.2d 684
(1983)).
192. A local agency includes any "government unit other than the Commonwealth gov-
ernment." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, § 8501 (1980).
193. See supra note 190.
194. See Damron v. Smith, 616 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (county prison board is
within purview of Act); Auerbach v. Council Rock School District, 74 Pa. Commw. 507, 459
A.2d 1376 (1983) (school district is a local agency immunized under Act); Morris v. Mont-
gomery County Geriatric & Rehabilitation Center, 74 Pa. Commw. 363, 459 A.2d 919 (1983)
(a county-operated rehabilitation center is protected by the Act).
195. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
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not bar the child's federal claim against the agency.198
Nonetheless, existing federal immunities may bar a section
1983 claim.'99 Two recent decisions reveal that despite these poten-
tial immunities, an abused foster child may sue a Pennsylvania
county. In Hynson v. City of Chester,200 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Delaware County Prison Board of Inspectors,
as a municipal corporation, was not entitled to the qualified immu-
nity defense.201
Similarly, in Sabo v. O'Bannon,20 2 a state hospital and Mont-
gomery County faced a section 1983 claim brought by the mother of
a mildly retarded patient who choked to death in the hospital, alleg-
edly due to an excessive drug administration.0 3 The mother claimed
that the hospital failed to provide adequate treatment and safe con-
ditions.20 4 The court held that a county may be liable under section
1983 if the challenged conduct represents official policy.20 5 The court
also held that the county may not rely on the good faith or absolute
immunity of its officers as a defense.20 6 Case law indicates, therefore,
that a Pennsylvania county agency facing a section 1983 claim can-
not assert a qualified immunity defense.20 7
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not had the
occasion to decide a case in which an abused foster child brought a
section 1983 claim against a county placement agency, the court's
decision in a similar case reveals how it may resolve such a suit. In
Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 20 8 a father, on behalf of his
198. In Wade v. City of Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1985), the plaintiff brought a
civil rights suit against the city and two of its police officers. The court stated that Pennsylva-
nia's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, "although effective against a state tort claim, has
no force when applied to suits under the Civil Rights Act. The supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution prevents a state from immunizing entities or individuals alleged to have violated federal
law." Id. at 407.
199. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
200. 827 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 702 (1988).
201. Id. at 934.
202. 586 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
203. Id. at 1135.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1143.
206. Id.
207. But see Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 14, Metro v. Elk
County Children's Servs., No. 88-213E (W.D. Pa. 1988). Defendant agency argued that it is a
county institution district, a legal entity created by Pennsylvania law. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, §§ 2201, 2301 (Purdon 1968). Because the agency is subject to control of the Common-
wealth and performs governmental functions, the agency argued that it is immune from suit
under the eleventh amendment, which provides that states cannot be subject to suit in federal
court unless the state has consented or unless Congress abrogates the immunity. Brief in Sup-
port of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 14, Metro v. Elk County Children's Servs., No. 88-
213E (W.D. Pa. 1988).
208. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
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daughter, pursued a section 1983 claim against the York County
Children and Youth Services Agency.20 9 In Bailey, five-year old
Aleta Bailey lived with her natural mother and her mother's boy-
friend.21 0 A relative observed severe bruises on the child's body and
notified the child abuse hotline."1' The York County agency inter-
vened and had the child examined. 12 The agency decided that the
mother's boyfriend should no longer have access to Aleta and condi-
tioned the child's return to her mother on the boyfriend's absence
from the home. 21 The next day, Aleta returned to her mother."" A
month later, Aleta was dead.21 5 The child's death was determined to
be a direct result of injuries inflicted by her mother and her mother's
boyfriend.218
Aleta's natural father filed suit, alleging that the York County
agency failed to undertake an investigation to determine the boy-
friend's whereabouts. 1 7 The father also alleged that the agency
failed to invoke the procedures of Pennsylvania's Child Protective
Services Law, which would have provided a judicial determination of
the necessity for protective custody. 218 The final allegation charged
"defective institutional policies and/or procedures. '"219
The district court granted the agency's motion to dismiss.220
The court stated that agencies can be charged with unconstitutional
conduct resulting from omissions in only two situations. The first is
when the injured party is in the custody of the state.22 ' The second is
when the actor, whose affirmative action causes the harm, is under
the direct control or supervision of the state.22 The court found
neither situation present and, although "deeply saddened and troub-
led,' 22 3 dismissed the case.
224
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's




213. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1985).
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216. Larry Hake, the boyfriend, was convicted of first degree murder. Aleta's mother
was convicted of third degree murder. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp. 794
(M.D. Pa. 1984).
217. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 505 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985).
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order and remanded.22 5 The court recognized that even in the ab-
sence of a custodial relationship, a right to protection may exist. 2 6
The court also stated that the father's allegations involved conduct
"rising to the level of deliberate indifference, reckless disregard, or
gross negligence by the agency and by its supervisory officials fairly
attributable to policies and practices of the agency." '22
Because the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bailey recog-
nized the legitimacy of a section 1983 claim against a county agency
even in a non-custodial setting, the court is likely to recognize a sec-
tion 1983 claim asserted by a plaintiff, such as a foster child, injured
while in a custodial setting.22 It appears that if an abused Pennsyl-
vania foster child claims a deprivation of his constitutional right to
safety, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals will allow the child to
maintain a section 1983 action. If the child can then sustain the bur-
den of showing that the agency's "practices are so far below the min-
imum accepted and generally prevailing professional standards as to
permit the fact finder to infer deliberate or reckless indifference or
unconcern or callous disregard for [the child's] safety" '229 the child
may then recover for his injuries.
V. Agency Liability for Foster Child Abuse in Pennsylvania
Although neither Pennsylvania state courts nor the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has decided a case in which a child abused in
225. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 511 (3d Cir. 1985).
226. Id. at 510-11.
227. Id. at 508.
228. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), a
natural father brutally abused his four-year old son, who fell into a coma and suffered severe
brain damage and retardation. Through his natural mother, the boy brought a § 1983 action
against the county and its placement agency, claiming that their failure to intervene and pro-
tect the child from the abuse that they knew or should have known about deprived him of his
liberty in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 1002. The Supreme Court, however, held
that the agency's failure to intervene did not constitute a violation of the boy's due process
rights. Id. at 1001.
Although the Court rejected the Bailey analysis that even in a non-custodial relationship,
the state may have an affirmative duty to protect the child, it did not close the doors to the
abused foster child seeking redress. Id. at 1006. The Court, distinguishing between victims of
abuse in a custodial setting and those in a non-custodial setting, stated:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free
society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect. Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held, by
analogy to Estelle and Youngberg, that the State may be held liable under the
Due Process Clause for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreat-
ment at the hands of their foster parents. We express no view on the validity of
this analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case.
Id. at 1006 n.9 (citations omitted).
229. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 1985).
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the Commonwealth's foster care system sued the county child and
youth services agency, the outcome of such a suit may be predicted
by examining Pennsylvania law and Third Circuit decisions in analo-
gous cases. Negligence actions, which have allowed abused foster
children to recover in other states, would prove unsuccessful in Penn-
sylvania.23 0 The Political Subdivision Torts Claims Act would pro-
vide the agency with an immunity defense. A section 1983 action, by
contrast, could be brought against the county agency.2 31 In light of
its decision in Bailey, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals would
likely hold that an abused foster child can state a cognizable sub-
stantive due process claim, actionable under section 1983.
Foster child abuse in Pennsylvania is a serious problem.232
Abused children lead lives marred by pain and suffering. The foster
parents who perpetrate the abuse may be held criminally liable.
When the county agency's negligence or deliberate indifference con-
tributes to the child's abuse, the civil law should also find the agency
liable. This finding of liability will serve two purposes. First, the
child will receive compensation for his injuries. 3 Second, the
agency will be encouraged to take greater care in placing and super-
vising the Commonwealth's foster children.234 If an agency is subject
to liability, placement agencies across the Commonwealth will re-
examine their policies and procedures. Agencies will perhaps hire
more employees or reassign heavy case loads. In addition, the agen-
cies will adhere more strictly to the comprehensive system of regula-
tions designed to protect foster children. Such reactions to a success-
ful suit against a county agency will likely result in a reduced
incidence of foster child abuse, and will encourage a higher degree of
supervision, to the benefit of Pennsylvania's foster children.
Such benefits, however, will not accrue to foster children when
the agency's negligence is the subject of suit. Because of statutory
immunity, Pennsylvania county child and youth services do not have
to answer for their negligence in placing and supervising the Com-
monwealth's foster children. Unless the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act is repealed or its exceptions broadened, no negligence
action can succeed. Pennsylvania foster children are therefore denied
230. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 195-229 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
233. See Comment, supra note 16, at 991 (arguing that a damage award to an abused
foster child does little to help solve the problem).
234. Id. ("[Hlolding the agency responsible for the inadequate supervision and the re-
sulting injuries could lead to prevention of future abuse.").
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both the compensatory and deterrent effects of a negligence suit. Al-
though it can be argued that governmental immunity should be abol-
ished to allow negligence suits against county agencies to proceed, it
appears unlikely that the legislature will abrogate the doctrine.
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Therefore, abused Pennsylvania foster children must look for recov-
ery in the federal courts.
A successful section 1983 action will provide the child with
compensation for his injuries and will deter the defendant agency
and other county agencies from further acts or omissions that display
deliberate indifference. Furthermore, the high burden of proof
placed on the abused foster child pursuing a section 1983 action will
ensure that the agency is not held liable for incidental or infrequent
acts of child abuse.23 6
Pennsylvania law reflects a recognition of and concern for the
grave problem of child abuse. The regulations governing the Com-
monwealth's foster care system are designed to ensure the protection
and safety of foster children. When this goal is not realized, how-
ever, the county child and youth services agency must answer for its
failure to keep the child safe from harm.
VI. Conclusion
Child abuse in Pennsylvania foster homes is a statistically small
but serious problem. To address that problem, an abused foster child
should be entitled to bring a cause of action against the county child
and youth services agency whose acts or omissions contributed to the
child's death or injury. Even if the child can prove all of the ele-
ments of a negligence case, however, governmental immunity bars a
successful suit. In contrast, a child who can meet the high burden of
proof required under a section 1983 action can pursue a civil rights
claim against the agency in federal court. A successful suit would
permit the child to recover for his injuries, and would help solve the
problem of abuse by encouraging the agency to take greater care in
supervising and placing Pennsylvania foster children.
235. The present Act is a legislative response to judicial abrogation of governmental
immunity. See supra note 189.
236. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989). The court stated:
This holding does not mean that every child in foster care may prevail in a
section 1983 action against state officials based on incidental injuries or infre-
quent acts of abuse; only where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state
officials were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child will liability be
imposed.
Id. at 797 (footnote omitted).
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Abused foster children endure lives of terror and suffering. Ac-
tions against the county placement agency that contributed to the
child's abuse would foster an awareness of the problem. Awareness is
the first step in ending the tragedy of foster child abuse. "We





There were little faces which should have been handsome, dark-
ened with the scowl of sullen dogged suffering; there was a
childhood with the light of its eye quenched, its beauty gone,
and its helplessness alone remaining; .... 2s8
Melissa A. Lengyel
237. In re Lowry, 317 Pa. Super. 304, 312, 464 A.2d 333, 337 (1983), rev'd, 506 Pa.
121, 484 A.2d 383 (1984).
238. CHARLES DICKENS, NICHOLAS NICKLEBY 151-52 (Penguin English lib. ed. 1981).
